Voter agency, institutional trust and “lesser-evil” voting<\/p>\n
Spitballing and thinking out loud here. This is pretty condensed, and if you,faithful reader, find something that needs to be addressed or is unclear, please comment. That’s why I’m putting this up here. I’m aware that this may seem like a belaboring of the obvious to many of you, but my goal is to clarify the factors that I believe underpin my dissatisfaction with our current political discourse, and have led to a loss of moral agency for voters. <\/p>\n
My interest here is stating the general case, as extrapolated from my own experience and perception. I’m not citing specific examples at this point: this is a speculative and reflective piece. <\/p>\n
For good measure, I’m tagging in a couple of folks who migh want to mix it up here: Jamie, Mike, Jessica, Mitch. <\/p>\n
Like justice, evaluations of moral behavior function as balance-scales. We add and subtract weights to one side or the other through actions and also through the opinions we hold and express. <\/p>\n
The moral value of an unexpressed opinion is ambiguous, because it cannot be fully known by others. However, the expression of opinion is a form of action, and ought to be evaluated as such. Opinions that have not been expressed may often be deduced from other kinds of actions and expression, and this is what creates our perception of the integrity of a subject: Integrity being an appearance of harmony between outward action and stated opinion. <\/p>\n
Let’s map this out. When the actions and expressed opinions of a subject …
\n\u2022 … appear consistent with each other, we tend to perceive integrity.
\n\u2022 … appear inconsistent with each other, we tend to perceive a lack of integrity.<\/p>\n
In our current discourse, we use words such as “authenticity” and “genuineness” as near synonyms of “integrity”, though they also carry the impression of other informative factors. Valuations of “Authenticity” imply that there are additional factually congruent experiences of an subject informing one’s perception of that subject, where as “genuineness” speaks to our perceptions the sincerity of the subject. In either case, I propose that these and similar terms are ultimately reducible to the term “integrity” in reference to the subjects of evaluation. Statements about integrity, then, may be asserted to be an evaluation of the congruence between the public persona and the internal state of the subject.<\/p>\n
There is another factor, as pertains to the domain of moral valuation: The ignorance or knowledgeability of the agent. <\/p>\n
Ignorance, in itself, is simply a lack of knowledge on a subject. It is not, as such, morally evaluable on its own. However, it is not without consequences with regard to the moral evaluation of actions. At best, it makes the outcome of those actions a dice-roll, and at worst it produces harmful outcomes. Those consequences *are* available for moral evaluation after the fact, and the agent’s participation is likewise evaluable.<\/p>\n
When determining the moral responsibility of the agent of an outcome, it seems to me that there are three criteria for determining the assignation moral weight to that agent:<\/p>\n
1) Knowledge that the eventual outcome was possible or reasonably probable.
\n 2) Willfull engagement in the action that precipitated the eventual outcome.
\n 3) Intent to precipitate the eventual outcome.<\/p>\n
In order for the agent under scrutiny to bear the full weight of moral laudability or liability for an outcome, all three of these factors must be maximized. That is to say that the agent must, have a complete dataset available on which to make a decision, must freely choose to act in a particular way based on that information, and must desire the outcome that did in fact occur, to have occurred. The complete satisfaction of these criteria is a practical impossibility, in proportion to the complexity of the issue being examined. We inhabit a complex world, and ideal situations and perfect information are rarely if ever a part of our experience. So, when we make moral evaluations we apply a grading curve to based on our own imperfect information and reasoned conjecture after the fact.<\/p>\n
For example, a soldier acting in good faith on orders to perform an action will have full intent, but incomplete knowledge of the circumstances that led to the those orders being issued. Because of the nature of the soldier’s contract, which entails trust in the chain of command, they are not a fully willfull participant in the outcome of his actions \u2014 they act in good faith that command has issued these orders on the basis of good and complete information and with the intention of a generally beneficial outcome. In the event that the outcome of the fulfillment of those orders is negative, then the greatest culpability must lie with those who issued those orders: those who were best informed, and took the action of issuing the orders. It quickly becomes plausible to assign little or no moral responsibility to the individual soldier for a great many actions conducted under orders in good faith. The primary example of an exception being a case where those orders are known by the soldier to be criminal in nature, and are executed nonetheless.<\/p>\n
With these definitions of integrity and criteria for moral responsibility in place, I’d like to attempt to explain the current predicament of the public in regards to political action, and in particular the act of voting. <\/p>\n
In exchange for the privilege of voting, the voter is asked to bear ultimate moral responsibility for the actions of the candidate they support. This is an axiomatic principle of the contract between the U.S. government and enfranchised citizens. There is an implicit mandate upon a voter to attempt to fulfill the criteria of morally responsible agency. That is to say that an ideal voter is:<\/p>\n
1) Knowledgable about the candidate or issue for whom they are voting. This includes the relevant history of the candidate and to be in possession of sufficient and accurate information to make reasonable conjecture about the positive and negative impacts of their decision in the wider field. This includes making judgements about the general character of their favored candidate, and specifically, the perceived integrity of the candidate.<\/p>\n
2) The voter must make a free and willful decision to vote for a candidate or issue. If a voter is coerced, misled or otherwise manipulated into casting a particular vote, then the willful agency of the voter is compromised. <\/p>\n
3) The voter must have intention to vote for a particular candidate or issue as a means of pursuing desired social and political outcomes the candidate represents, as underwritten by the voter’s belief in the integrity of the candidate.<\/p>\n
When the ability of the voter to reasonably meet these criteria is subverted, the act of voting is then deprived of moral force, and deprives the voter of moral agency. In support of this ideal voter, society, and government as the agent of that society, are obligated under a reciprocal mandate to ensure that the voter has access to the means of becoming an ideal voter: <\/p>\n
1) To make available accurate and accessible information about the subject of a vote, be it an issue or candidate for office.<\/p>\n
2) To ensure that the voting public is free from coercion and manipulation, and thus able to act with moral agency.<\/p>\n
3) To see that the intention of the voting population is made manifest.<\/p>\n
On Perceived Voter Knowledgeability, Willfull Action and Intent:<\/p>\n
We have the misfortune to find ourselves in a time and place in which government is perceived by nearly all sides and interests to be acting as a bad-faith sovereign placed above the people, and not as the good-faith representative agent of our society. Contributing to this perception are allegations of a wide range of bad-faith acts of government, that the regulatory powers of government are exercised to protect the interests of the few, rather than for the benefit of the wider society, of media bias in news coverage and evidence of a multiplicity of issues in the electoral system itself. <\/p>\n
For the sake of this writing, the factuality of any particular claim need not be proven. It is sufficient here to acknowledge that these claims are present in and significant to our political discourse to make a case that voter agency is obstructed.<\/p>\n
While it could be argued that it is incumbent on the voter to arrive at their own conclusions on these issues, it is inarguable that voters have been demanding increased transparency in the actions and decisions of government on the grounds that they are inhibited in forming the well-founded evaluations required to fulfill the ideal voter mandate; i.e. that government is widely perceived as not adequately fulfilling its obligation to voters to provide sufficient and accurate information on which to found good voter judgement. <\/p>\n
Additionally, the perception that the media, in an age in which the courts have determined that the “news-tainment” doesn’t have accountability to truth, is not a reliable source of information. A lack of clear seperation between factual and editorial content certainly contributes to this, as is the fact that there are far fewer media companies providing comprehensive news services. In fact, only three television news services are regularly cited: MSNBC, CNN, and FOX News \u2014 all three of which are associated with other media organs that display similar and identifiable editorial biases. As of 2014, Gallup polls shows indicated that only ~40% of the population had some level of trust in mass media. [http:\/\/ift.tt\/1u0lH3P]
\nFacts and speculation are rarely clearly delineated in the presentation style of our media, with the result that disinformation and misinformation run rampant and uncorrected. <\/p>\n
That same media is also the primary instrument by which the government communicates with voters. If both the government and its instrument of communication are held as untrustworthy, on what basis can a voter meet the first criterion of the ideal voter: to form a reasoned and knowledgable position on which to base their action? <\/p>\n
To address the matter of willfull agency, let me state that the key components of willfull agency are: the ability to act freely; to act in accordance with or contribute to one’s own sense of integrity; and finally, that action must be perceived to possess consequence or make a difference. The reduction or negation of any of these impacts the capacity and willingness of an agent to act a moral agent, rather than as a mere tool, or to abnegate action altogether. <\/p>\n
The structure of the primary system and delegate allocation mechanisms thereof, as well as the existence of the electoral college mechanism in which the delegate responsibility to represent the popular vote is \u2014 at best \u2014 adulterated, are significant issues with regard to the representation of the voting population and their sense of agency. Both of these instruments are widely seen as mechanisms by which entrenched power is able to override the popular vote. Historically, there have been four cases in which the electoral college has overturned the popular vote. (FYI: 1824, 1876, 1888 and 2000) However, the primary system and party delegate allocation system is plagued by inconsistent, ever changing rules regarding delegate allocation, from caucus versus primary systems, to open\/closed primaries with proportional and zero-sum outcomes, to the recent addition of utterly un-beholden superdelegates, whose mandate is support the candidate that party power-brokers support. <\/p>\n
Participation in primaries and caucuses has been in a general decline since the 1970s, and bottomed out in 1996. In regard to the races run in particular years, however, early-voting or caucusing states have significantly higher turnouts than the later voting states. This can be at least partially attributed to the perceived consequential significance of the action of voters at the beginning and end of the primary\/caucus cycle. The implication is that a voter in the last states to hold a primary or caucus, perceives their vote as either reifying a by-now-foregone conclusion, or levying a futile protest, rather than significantly impactful. [http:\/\/ift.tt\/21ccRxG] <\/p>\n
These mechanical issues are just part of what leads to the perceived loss of agency. Allegations of gerrymandering, voting machine tampering, ballot ‘invalidation’, absentee-ballot discard and ‘special circumstances’-only counting (e.g. absentee ballots only counted if needed as tie-breakers), ballot unavailability and similar reports all serve to remove the sense of agency from eligible voters. Particularly in the world of the 24 hour news cycle, high profile stories about polling corruption and influence reaching millions of voters seem likely to amplify this effect. It may be arguable that the timing of such coverage is itself a tool used to remove voter agency by reinforcing the sense of futility.<\/p>\n
The result is a population lacks confidence in the integrity of their means of communication to power, and in which their willingness to accept the burden of moral agency is impacted. In the case of voters, this loss of the sense of agency can manifest as anything from a conscientious decision not to vote to registering a vote of “no confidence” or writing in a valid alternative candidate or even the classic “Mickey Mouse” vote.<\/p>\n
Finally, to address the intent of the voter to effect a particular end, there are two aspects to be addressed. The first of which is that a voter ought sincerely desire the ends that a vote for the candidate signifies in order to vote with integrity. The second point is that should the voter have been deceived, the voter has then been deprived of agency in that matter. These touch on the ability of the voter to perform the act of voting with integrity, and a demand for integrity from candidates themselves and in the presentation of ballot initiatives.<\/p>\n
For a voter to be able to act with full agency, they should be able to cast an positive vote in favor of a candidate whose views they share at least in part, with full faith that their vote will be counted. That is to say that they endorse some or all of the positions represented by the candidate. <\/p>\n
Reciprocally, the candidate is morally obligated to act with integrity in relation to the platform on which they campaigned: that is, to attempt to produce the ends desired by their voters. Should this not occur, then the candidate has acted in such a way as to breach the trust of the voter, and in doing so, undermined the agency of the voters.<\/p>\n
Thus we run afoul of the matter of “lesser-evil” voting, wherein a voter feels they must compromise their integrity and vote for a candidate solely because that candidate is less apparently harmful than another, even if such a vote in opposition to their conscience. This case represents a very troubling dilemma, and indeed, constitutes a form of voter duress. If a person is given a choice between cutting their own throat or hanging themselves in lieu of harm befalling another and then being executed, they are not, in effect being offered a choice which allows them moral agency. Lesser-evil voting is a situation which can only arise when the political environment \u2014 comprising the distribution of knowledge, the agency of the voter, and the integrity of the candidates are all perceived as compromised by the voting public: The voter perceives that they can only choose between abdication of their franchise, or casting a vote for a candidate perceived to be less harmful than the alternative, and thereby affirm support for the harm they believe will come from their choice. It’s a lose-lose scenario and exercise in futility. via Facebook Voter agency, institutional trust and “lesser-evil” voting Spitballing and thinking out loud here. This is pretty condensed, and if you,faithful reader, find something that needs to be addressed or is unclear, please comment. That’s why I’m putting this up here. … Continue reading
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